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Abstract:  
The paper provides a comprehensive overview of the gradual evolution of the supervisory 
policy adopted by the Basle Committee for the regulatory treatment of asset securitisation. 
We carefully highlight the pathology of the new “securitisation framework” to facilitate a 
general understanding of what constitutes the current state of computing adequate capital 
requirements for securitised credit exposures. Although we incorporate a simplified sensitivity 
analysis of the varying levels of capital charges depending on the security design of asset 
securitisation transactions, we do not engage in a profound analysis of the benefits and 
drawbacks implicated in the new securitisation framework. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1  Loan securitisation and regulatory arbitrage 
 
The broadbrush determination of capital requirements for credit risk exposures in the one-size-
fits-all regulatory straightjacket of the 1988 Basle Capital Accord has rendered the cost-effective 
origination of loans (especially investment-grade credits) increasingly difficult and prompted 
banks to consider large-scale loan securitisation as one way to lower their regulatory cost of 
capital. Securitisation generally refers to the process of refinancing a diversified pool of illiquid 
present or future financial and/or non-financial receivables through the issue of structured claims 
into negotiable capital market paper issued to capital market investors (liquidity transformation and 
asset diversification process).1 The fairly indiscriminate risk-weighting and a flat regulatory capital 
charge for on-balance sheet credit risk exposures under the existing regulatory framework of the 
1988 Basle Capital Accord and later amendments made it less efficient for banks to retain highly 
rated loans (with low yields relative to required regulatory capital) vis-à-vis risky loans with high 
net interest income. The main channel through which banks arbitraged these inflexible regulatory 
provisions was by offering securitised debt on their better quality assets, whilst retaining their 
riskier assets on their own books. Consequently, the market for securitised assets grew 
dramatically from the early 1990s onwards and attracted a large following with all major 
investment banks (Jobst, 2003).  
 
1.2  The consultative process of the Basle Committee 
 
Following protracted efforts over recent years to enhance financial market stability,  the Basle 
Committee on Banking Supervision2 on 11 May 2004 finally reached agreement on new 
international rules for the capital adequacy of internationally active banks in International 
Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: a Revised Framework (June 2004), termed 
“Basle 2”. It provides binding guidance as to establishment of international convergence on 
revisions to supervisory regulations governing bank capital. The new regulatory provisions link 
minimum capital requirements closer with the actual riskiness of bank assets in order to redress 
shortcomings in the old system of the overly simplistic 1988 Basle Accord. The new regulations 
represent the final outcome of a series of consultations, each of which followed the three 
                                                 
1 See Moody’s Investor Services (2003) for a brief introduction to asset-backed securitisation (ABS). 
2 The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision is a steering group of all G10 member countries of the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS).    3 
proposals for revising the capital adequacy framework in June 1999, January 2001 and April 
2003, with associated quantitative impact studies.3 
 
Given the rapid growth of securitisation markets around the world, the Basle Committee 
acknowledged the importance of asset securitisation as an emergent structured finance funding 
tool for financial intermediaries and adopted a comprehensive regulatory policy for asset 
securitisation, which was deemed critical to a viable implementation of a revised Basle Accord.4 
As an integral part of the new proposal of the Basle Accord (Basle Committee, 2004b), the Basle 
Committee was poised to establish the so-called Securitisation Framework based on earlier 
provisions in the (Third) Consultative Paper to the New Basle Accord (April 2003) and subsequent 
Changes to the Securitisation Framework (January 2004) in response to new developments in bank-
based structured finance and growing sophistication in synthetic forms of asset securitisation. 
Prior to the Securitisation Framework, which will finally come into force in 2006, the Basle 
Committee had made several proposals and revisions for a consistent regulatory treatment of 
securitised exposures based on feedback received from banks and supervisory agencies.  
 
The First Consultative Paper (see Fig. 1), released by the Securitisation Group of the Basle Committee in 
June 1999, introduced a general securitisation proposal, which was later expanded upon in the 
Second Consultative Paper on securitisation in January 2001. At this stage, the drafting of common 
regulatory policy focused primarily on the standardised treatment of traditional securitisation 
transactions, where banks were required to assign risk-weights to securitisation exposures based 
on few observable characteristics, such as an issue rating. However, it also presented an initial 
distinction of sponsoring and investing banks, revolving asset securitisation, cash advancement 
and liquidity facilities as well as risk transfer requirements for traditional securitisation. 
 
After consultation with the industry and further analyses, the Basle Committee issued the First 
Working Paper on the Treatment of Asset Securitisation in October 2001 (see Fig. 1), which comprised 
an in-depth internal-ratings based (IRB) treatment of securitisation exposures in addition to the 
standardised, “one size fits all” approach. It also sought to initiate further consultation on a 
concrete treatment of synthetic securitisation, liquidity facilities and early amortisation features, 
which culminated in the Securitisation Framework (Credit Risk – Securitisation Framework, §IV of 
the QIS 3 Technical Guidance) before yet another round of consultation talks then commenced 
to fine-tune the quantitative criteria of higher risk-sensitivity in the determination of minimum 
capital requirements for issuers and investors of securitisation transactions. The products of this 
                                                 
3 For a general discourse on the rationale of banking regulation we refer readers to Benston and Kaufman 
(1996) as well as Besanko and Kanatas (1996). 
4 Failure to do so would have certainly missed the objective of financial stability set out by the Basle 
Committee.    4 
latest regulatory effort were the Second Working Paper on the Treatment of Asset Securitisation of 
October 2002 and the (Third) Consultative Paper to the New Basle Accord of April 2003, which – 
among many new qualitative aspects of securitisation regulation, such as supervisory review 
(Pillar 2) and market discipline (Pillar 3) – also proposed a more ratings-based approach (RBA) for 
securitisation transactions in line with the distinction of the standardised approach and the internal 
ratings-based (IRB) approach to the computation of general minimum capital requirements. 
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Fig. 1. The evolution of securitisation framework by the Basle Committee. 
 
As a decisive step on the way towards a securitisation framework, the Committee issued the 
Second Working Paper on the Treatment of Asset Securitisation on 28 October 2002, a result of a series 
of consultations to sound out the viability of new, more risk-sensitive elements of a securitisation 
framework it had already set forth in the First Working Paper on the Treatment of Asset Securitisation. 
The existing regulatory framework according to the 1988 Basle Accord then fell short of providing 
guidance on the comprehensive treatment of synthetic securitisation structures, liquidity facilities, 
asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) programmes and securitisation transactions of revolving 
credit exposures containing early amortisation features. Besides improvements to the standardised 
and the internal-ratings based (IRB) treatment as well as the supervisory formula approach (SFA) in 
context of capital adequacy in securitisation, the Second Working Paper on the Treatment of Asset 
Securitisation was mainly put forward in the effort to request input from banking organisations on 
the need of future modifications to the existing proposal or adjustments to the regulatory 
treatment of asset securitisation. Notwithstanding its tentative nature as a way to solicit feedback 
from financial institutions concerning the supervisory review component (“Pillar 2”, see Basle    5 
Committee, 2002a and 2002b),
5 the Second Working Paper on the Treatment of Asset Securitisation 
represented a purposeful attempt to address critical gaps in the securitisation framework.  
 
Before the conclusion of the third consultative phase on the regulatory treatment of asset 
securitisation, the Basle Committee issued its Changes to the Securitisation Framework (January 2004) 
to establish greater consistency of capital charges for (i) securitised exposures and conventional 
credit risk of the same rating grade and (ii) similar exposures across different regulatory 
approaches in the bid to reduce the complexity of the (Third) Consultative Paper to the New Basle 
Accord (April 2003). Eventually, after incorporating most of the proposed modifications in 
Changes to the Securitisation Framework, the Basle Committee released the final version of the 
securitisation framework as part of the new Basle Accord of International Convergence of Capital 
Measurement and Capital Standards. 
 
1.3  Objective and structure 
 
The following sections provide a comprehensive overview of the gradual evolution of the 
Securitisation Framework for the treatment of asset securitisation, a culmination of a series of 
consultative processes completed by the Basle Committee in response to the continued use of 
loan securitisation for purposes of regulatory arbitrage. We carefully probe the founding 
components of this new regulatory framework so as to provide accessible understanding of what 
constitutes a consistent yet still contested regulatory approach to the computation of adequate 
capital requirements for securitised credit exposures. Although we incorporate a simplified 
sensitivity analysis of the varying levels of capital charges depending on the configuration of asset 
securitisation transactions, we do not engage in a profound analytical discourse about the 
benefits and drawbacks that the new securitisation framework entails. 
 
In the following section, we first explain the contents of the First Consultative Paper and the Second 
Consultative Paper of 2001, before moving on to specify the supervisory formula approach (SFA) and 
the ratings-based approach (RBA) in their original tenors as stated in the Second Working Paper on the 
Treatment of Securitisation (Basle Committee, 2002a and 2002b), which had been the first account 
of a consistent regulatory policy for asset securitisation until the adoption of the (Third) 
Consultative Paper to the New Basle Accord (Basle Committee, 2003). Finally, a final exposition of 
substantial modifications to the regulatory treatment of securitisation under the IRB approach in 
the new Basle Accord of International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards (Basle 
Committee, 2004b) outlines the Changes to the Securitisation Framework (Basle Committee, 2004a). 
 
                                                 
5 See also Basle Committee (2003).    6 
2  THE PATHOLOGY OF THE REGULATORY TREATMENT 
OF ASSET SECURITISATION – THE SECURITISATION 
FRAMEWORK 
 
2.1 The  new  Basle Accord and the regulatory treatment of asset securitisation 
 
The revised version of the Basle Accord rests fundamentally on three regulatory pillars. In 
principle, the first pillar (Pillar 1, “Minimum Capital Requirements”) is set for a similar tenor as 
the 1988 Basle Accord, which requires banks to meet minimum capital requirements for 
exposures to credit risk, market risk and operational risk. Banks are permitted to use any one of 
the following approaches to the computation of regulatory capital: the standard approach, the 
foundation internal ratings-based (IRB) approach or the advanced internal ratings-based (IRB) approach. 
Although most attention has been devoted to capital adequacy set out in Pillar 1, the two 
remaining pillars are believed to be of even greater importance (The Economist, 2004). The 
second pillar (Pillar 2, “Supervisory Review”) grants discretion to national supervisory authorities 
to tweak regulatory capital levels, e.g. they may impose additional capital charges for risk 
exposures they deem insufficiently covered in Pillar 1. Pillar 2 also includes the requirement for 
banks to develop internal processes to assess their overall capital adequacy commensurate to 
their risk profile in compliance with supervisory standards, and to maintain appropriate capital 
levels. The third pillar (Pillar 3, “Market Discipline”) compels banks to disclose more 
information to financial markets under the objective of strengthening their market discipline and 
transparent risk management practices (Basle Committee, 2003). 
 
Similar to the on-balance sheet treatment of straightforward credit exposures, the revised Basle 
Accord also requires banks to hold a certain amount of capital against any securitisation exposure 
under the Securitisation Framework for Credit Risk. It applies to securitisation transactions (synthetic 
or traditional) involving one or more underlying credit exposures from which stratified positions 
(or tranches) are created that reflect different degrees of risk. Besides distinguishing between 
different transaction structures, the securitisation framework not only accounts for the 
characteristics of securitised assets in terms of both available rating and portfolio characteristics 
but also for the different roles played by banks in the securitisation process (e.g. originating bank, 
investing bank and servicing agent/sponsoring bank). Originating banks are of particular interest 
in this exposition of capital adequacy, mainly because they must satisfy a set of operational 
criteria depending on the type of transaction structure. Interestingly, these operational criteria for 
the capital treatment of traditional and synthetic structures are based on the economic substance 
of the credit risk transfer rather than its legal form. While initial proposals almost exclusively 
focused on traditional (true sale) securitisation transactions, subsequent amendments also 
included credit risk transfer exposures arising from synthetic transactions, investments in ABS    7 
securities and retentions of subordinated tranches, as well as liquidity facilities and credit 
enhancements. The securitisation framework distinguishes only between the so-called standardised 
approach and the internal ratings-based approach (IRB) in the way investing and originating banks 
compute the regulatory capital charge for securitised positions as so-called “risk-weighted assets” 
by multiplying the notional amount of securitised tranches by a specific risk-weight applied to the 
standard capital ratio of 8%.  
 
2.2 The  Consultative Package: The First Consultative Paper, the Second Consultative 
Paper and the First Working Paper on the Treatment of Asset Securitisation 
 
After the first serious attempts at formulating a regulatory position on the regulatory governance 
of asset securitisation in the First Consultative Paper in June 1999 the Basle Committee issued the 
Second Consultative Paper for the capital requirements of asset securitisation transactions on 16 
January 2001, which eventually led to the publication of the First Working Paper on the Treatment of 
Asset Securitisation in October 2001. This revised proposal for an adjustment of regulatory capital 
and supervision by financial regulators was published as a separate 32-page chapter of a new 
proposal for the Basle Accord on the International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital 
Standards  as a comprehensive effort to codify a regulatory framework. Although the First 
Consultative Paper had already set out definitions of key aspects of securitisation and established 
minimum operational criteria related to traditional (true sale) structures of credit risk transfer (i.e. 
where the originator transfers assets usually to an SPV), it remained completely silent on 
synthetic transactions as a coming structural innovation in asset securitisation. It was not until the 
First Working Paper on the Treatment of Asset Securitisation was published that initial regulatory 
provisions were revised to include a separate section on synthetic securitisation and operational 
criteria for the status of banks in securitisation transactions.6 The subsequent exposition outlines 
the most prominent aspects raised in the First Working Paper on the Treatment of Asset Securitisation.7 
 
2.2.1  Definition of true sale transactions by originating banks 
 
The outright transfer of assets off the balance sheet in standard (true sale) transactions represents 
the most fundamental case of regulatory relief sought by an originating bank. The originating 
bank is permitted to remove assets from the calculation of risk-based capital ratios only if a 
“clean break” (or “credit de-linkage”) of transferred assets meets regulatory approval. According 
                                                 
6 Besides the critical issue of information disclosure requirements, the revised proposal also draws an 
important distinction between implicit/residual risks and explicit risks in securitisation. In this context 
implicit risk refers to residual risk that is thought of not being legally assumed by an originating or 
sponsoring bank; however, due to an obligatory commitment to safeguard investors’ interests it might still 
be tacitly recognised to that extent that actions in defiance of an understanding might prejudicially affect 
the reputation of the originating or sponsoring bank participating in a securitisation transaction.  
7 See Basle Committee (2001), 87ff.    8 
to the First Working Paper on the Treatment of Asset Securitisation, regulatory capital relief through true 
sale transactions applies only if the following operational criteria are satisfied: (i) in compliance 
with legal provisions governing asset sales, the transferred assets have been legally isolated from 
the transferor; that is, the assets are put beyond the reach of the transferor and its creditors, even 
in bankruptcy or receivership; (ii) the transferee is a qualifying special-purpose vehicle (SPV) and 
the holders of the beneficial interests in that entity have the right to pledge or exchange those 
interests, and (iii) the transferor does not maintain effective or indirect control over the 
transferred assets.8 Unless these conditions hold, the Basle Committee proposes to retain the 
respective assets on the books of the originating bank for regulatory accounting purposes (RAP), 
even if the assets have been removed from the books under GAAP standards. These operational 
criteria were refined later on in the Second Working Paper on the Treatment of Asset 
Securitisation and the new Securitisation Framework of the agreement on International Convergence 
of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards  by the Basle Committee (see section 2.4). 
 
2.2.2  Regulatory capital requirements of originating and investing banks 
 
The regulatory provisions in the Second Consultative Paper and the First Working Paper on the 
Treatment of Asset Securitisation also specify minimum capital requirements of securitised exposures 
held by investing banks (and originating banks, if they retain a fraction of the original transaction 
volume or a standing commitment/residual claim). For loss of detailed information about the 
underlying exposures of securitised reference portfolios, investing banks are required to hold 
regulatory capital for positions of securitisation transactions. In a nod to previous regulatory 
advances the Second Consultative Paper proffers the adoption of ratings-based risk weightings 
(“ratings-based approach” (RBA)) for rated tranches (see Tab. 1 below) as a regulatory default 
risk equivalent to their external rating grade. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tab. 1. Risk-weights according to the revised “Consultative Package” (2001). 
 
                                                 
8 These conditions are essentially the same as in IAS 39/FASB 140/FASB 125, and therefore, there is no 
new restriction or qualifying condition being put up by the regulators.  
Risk weighting
AAA AA- 20%
A+ A- 50%
BBB+ BBB- 100%
BB+ BB- 150%
B+ D capital deduction*
unrated capital deduction*
* regarded as credit enhancement
Rating range   9 
In the case of low-risk, unrated tranches (e.g. in private placements) or guarantees, the Basle 
Committee introduced the so-called look-through approach for the calculation of the capital charge. 
Subject to supervisory review this approach requires that the unrated, most senior position of a 
transaction will receive the average risk-weight that would otherwise be assigned to all securitised 
credit exposures in underlying portfolio on aggregate, whilst all subsequent, less senior tranches 
(mezzanine classes but also second loss facilities and other similar structural enhancements) will 
be accorded a 100% risk-weighting. An originating bank (but also a sponsoring or even an 
investing bank) might provide a first or second loss position as credit support (credit 
enhancement).9,10 For instance, the originating bank commonly retains the most junior, unrated 
tranche as a first loss piece. Any first loss position would be fully deducted from capital, whilst a 
second loss facility is considered to be a credit substitute with a 100% risk-weighting after it has 
been valued at an arm’s length basis in line with normal credit approval and review processes. 
The restrictive use of the look-through approach for the most senior positions implies that investing 
banks (which hold the more senior “investor” positions) are effectively exposed to the aggregate 
default risk arising from securitised exposures. According paragraph 527 of the First Consultative 
Paper the following conditions would need to be satisfied for the look through approach to be 
applicable: 
 
(i)  rights on the underlying assets are held either directly by investors, by an 
independent trustee11 on their behalf, or by a mandated representative; 
(ii)  in the case of a direct claim, the holder of the securities has an undivided pro rata 
ownership interest in the underlying assets, i.e. the underlying assets are subject to 
                                                 
9 Under the First Working Paper on the Treatment of Asset Securitisation the originating bank would need to 
deduct the notional amount of the first loss position directly from its capital stock. Thus, if a sponsoring 
bank, for instance, accepts a credit enhancement for first losses in the amount of €5m out for a €100m 
transaction, a full capital deduction (which implies a risk-weighting of 1250%) reflects the capital loss in 
case of default. However, any additional loss protection is viewed as a direct credit substitute with a 100% risk 
weighting, provided that a sufficient and significant level of first loss protection is being provided. Hence, a 
second loss provision of €10m on top of a first loss protection of €5m would incur a further capital charge 
of €0.8m. 
10 The Basle Committee (2002b) defines credit enhancement as a contractual arrangement [,] in which the 
bank retains or assumes a securitisation exposure and, in substance, provides some degree of added 
protection to other parties to the transaction. [...].” According the current regulatory framework, the optimal 
structure of securitisation transactions would avoid a first loss piece altogether, so there would be no specific 
credit enhancement for the most junior tranche. Consequently, the degree of the credit enhancement 
needed also proxies for the discrepancy of standardised minimum capital requirements and the issuer’s 
own assessment of adequate risk provision for a certain quality of the reference portfolio to be securitised. 
However, if the provision of a so-called “first loss piece” cannot be avoided, the issuers follow the 
objective of setting credit enhancement levels as low as possible. Although credit enhancement is commonly 
derived from internal sources, i.e. they may be generated from the assets themselves, it can take a wide 
range of external forms, which includes third-party guarantees, letters of credit from highly-rated banks, 
reserve funds, first and second loss provisions and cash collateral accounts, which have overtaken letters of 
credit as the method of choice for major public transactions. 
11 e.g. by having priority perfected security interest in the underlying assets.    10 
proportional rights of investors, whilst the SPV must not have any liabilities 
unrelated to the transaction; 
(iii)  in the case of an indirect claim,  
a.  all liabilities of the trust or special purpose vehicle (or conduit) that issues the 
securities are related to the issued securities; 
b.  the underlying assets must be fully performing when securities are issued; 
c.  the securities are structured such that the cash flow from the underlying assets 
fully meets the cash flow requirements of the securities without undue reliance 
on any reinvestment income, i.e. the securitisation transaction perfectly matches 
the cash flow stream generated from the underlying portfolio; and 
d.  funds earmarked as pay-out to investors but not yet disbursed do not carry a 
material reinvestment risk. 
 
Furthermore, the look-through approach requires a risk-weighting of unrated tranches equal to 
the highest risk-weight assigned to an asset of the reference portfolio. When the First Consultative 
Paper was published, however, the method proposed by the Basle Committee still lacked 
sufficient clarification of how the capital charge would be determined in this case. At the time, 
two basic approaches would have lent themselves as suitable means of resolution either: (i) some 
inferred external rating of an unrated securitisation tranches or (ii) the quantification of both the 
residual risk held by the originating bank following the securitisation of assets and the amount of 
credit risk that was actually transferred in the stratified positions of securitised exposures. Soon it 
became clear that the incentive of originating banks to engage in regulatory arbitrage by shifting 
high quality assets from their balance sheet would require regulatory action to prevent banks 
from assuming a higher risk profile at the same regulatory charge. Hence, the Basle Committee 
gave more credence to a model-based method of deriving risk-weights for unrated tranches. 
 
2.2.3  Regulatory distinction between credit support and liquidity support in securitisation programmes and 
asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) conduits 
 
The notion of sponsoring or managing banks includes the administration of securitisation 
programmes or asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) conduits, where credit exposures from 
different banks and/or small business creditors are pooled in a securitised reference portfolio. 
These conduits typically feature an integrated liquidity support mechanism by sponsoring banks 
(either programme-wide or pool-specific). Such a contractually fixed commitment to lend on the 
part of the sponsoring or managing bank attracts risk-weightings depending on its maturity. 
While a short-term agreement to lend is converted with a 0% risk-weighting, any long-term 
agreement is treated as a direct credit substitute, and, thus, attracts a 100% risk-weighting. 
Moreover, as one of several special provisions concerning such off-balance sheet exposures, the    11 
First Working Paper on the Treatment of Asset Securitisation addresses mounting concern over the 
regulatory treatment of liquidity facilities to ABCP as credit enhancement without any clear-cut 
practical distinction of credit support and liquidity support being put in place. Consequently, the 
Basle Committee has established a set of essential criteria to conceptually distinguish liquidity 
support from credit support: 
 
(i)  a facility, fixed in time and duration, must provided to the SPV, not to investors, which 
is subject to usual banking procedures, 
(ii)  the SPV must have the option at its disposal to seek credit support from elsewhere, 
(iii)  the terms of the facility must be established on grounds of a clear identification in what 
circumstances it might be drawn, ruling out the utilisation of the facility either as a 
provider of credit support, source of permanent revolving funding or as cover for 
sustained asset losses, 
(iv)  the facility should include a contractual provision (on the basis of a reasonable asset 
quality test) either to prevent a drawing from being used to cover deteriorated or 
defaulted assets or reduce or terminate the facility for a specified decline in asset quality, 
and 
(v)  the payment of the fee for the facility should not be further subordinated or subject to a 
waiver or deferral, while the drawings under the facility should not be subordinated to 
the interests of the note holders. 
 
If the above-mentioned criteria hold, liquidity support as a contingent commitment for future 
lending draws a 20% conversion factor. Otherwise, the liquidity facility will qualify as a credit 
enhancement, which would be treated no different than an investment in a securitisation 
transaction with a risk-weighting based on either internal or external ratings. So a back-of-the-
envelope calculation of a liquidity facility for a partly-supported ABCP conduit of €100m (of 
which €50m have already been drawn) would require a capital charge of €50m+(€100m-
€50m)*20%=€60m. 
 
Moreover, the First Working Paper on the Treatment of Asset Securitisation considers the 
reimbursement of cash advances by the servicing bank in the context of liquidity or credit 
support granted to an SPV. Nonetheless, it recognises contractual provision for temporary 
advances to ensure uninterrupted payments to investors only as long as “the payment to any 
investors from the cash flows stemming from the underlying asset pool and the credit 
enhancement [are] subordinated to the reimbursement of the cash advance.” This qualification 
ensures seniority of cash advances and requires the servicer of the transaction to withhold a 
commensurate fraction of the subsequent cash collections to recoup previous cash advances. 
    12 
2.2.3.1  Revolving asset securitisation 
 
In most revolving asset securitisation transactions, the SPV advances funds to the originating 
bank in the form of revolving credit in return for the receipt of periodic repayments from a pool 
of outstanding loans that this refinancing arrangement allows the originator continue to 
generate.12 At the same time, the SPV refinances itself by issuing commoditised structured claims 
as debt securities to capital market investors. These revolving securitisation structures are 
frequently supplemented by early amortisation triggers, which force an early wind-down of 
repayment of principal and interest to investors in the event of a significant deterioration of 
securitised portfolio value due to higher than expected levels of debtor delinquency and/or loan 
termination. However, in the case of a sudden drop in the cash flow position of the underlying 
reference portfolio, the originator could be denied a timely withdrawal of revolving credit from 
the SPV. Early amortisation compels the SPV to use cash flows from securitised loans to pay 
down investors instead of revolving the amount back to the originator because the originator’s 
claim in appropriating collections in replenishing the collateral portfolio is subordinated to the 
payment claims of investors. 
 
Although early amortisation functions like credit support to the benefit of investors, the Basle 
Committee considers such a mechanism potentially hazardous to proper cash flow allocation if 
early amortisation is triggered in the context of revolving asset securitisation transactions. Hence, 
if a transaction includes an “amortisation trigger”, the First Working Paper on the Treatment of Asset 
Securitisation set forth that the notional amount of the securitised asset pool is to be regarded a 
credit equivalent and charged with a minimum 10% conversion factor for the off-balance sheet 
piece of the reference portfolio, which may be increased by national regulatory authorities 
depending on their assessment of various operational requirements. 
 
2.3 The  Second Working Paper on the Treatment of Asset Securitisation and the 
(Third) Consultative Paper (CP3) 
 
The Second Working Paper on the Treatment of Asset Securitisation (Basle Committee, 2002a and 2002b) 
refines the preceding consultative process on the treatment of synthetic transactions by 
providing a more detailed specification of distinctive operational criteria applicable to different 
types of transaction structures, depending on their economic substance rather than their legal 
form. An originating bank is exempted from including securitised exposures in the calculation of 
their minimum regulatory capital requirement for credit risk if the following conditions below 
hold:  
    13 
(i) traditional  securitisation: 
a.  the credit risk of associated exposures has been transferred to third parties; 
b.  no legal and/or economic recourse: the transferor has no direct or indirect 
control over the transferred assets, i.e. assets are legally isolated from the 
transferor and beyond the reach of the transferor and its creditors, even in the 
event of insolvency or receivership (which must be supported by a legal 
opinion);13 
c.  the transferee is a qualifying special-purpose vehicle (SPV) and the holders of 
the beneficial interests in that entity have the right to pledge or exchange those 
interests without restrictions; 
d.  investors purchasing debt securities issued by the SPV as a means of refinancing 
the purchasing price of the securitised assets have a claim on the underlying 
assets but not on the transferor; 
e.  clean-up calls are permissible if they are (i) not mandatory, (ii) exercised at the 
discretion of the originating bank and (iii) not designed as credit support;14 and  
f.  transaction must not contain clauses that would require the originator  to 
systematically alter (i) the asset quality of the reference portfolio, (ii) the level of 
credit enhancement and (iii) the nominal investor return after inception of the 
securitisation transaction. 
 
(ii) synthetic  securitisation: 
a.  originating banks must have sought appropriate legal opinion, which verifies 
that the contractual obligations arising from the documented credit risk transfer 
are legally enforceable and binding to all parties involved; 
b.  significant transfer of credit risk of securitised exposures to third party and 
protection provider as eligible guarantor; 
c.  the credit quality of the [credit default swap] counterparty (i.e. the protection 
provider) and the value of the securitised reference portfolio must not have a 
material positive correlation; 
d.  clearly defined redemption criteria: procedures for timely liquidation of 
collateral in a credit event/default of the counterparty; 
                                                                                                                                            
12 See also Grill and Perczynski (1993) for a more detailed description. 
13 Direct control is defined as any provision that gives rise to economic recourse, such as the possibility to 
repurchase transferred exposures or the obligation to retain some residual risk in the performance of 
transferred assets. 
14 The exercise of a clean-up call should be limited to cases when the notional value of assets <10% and 
the cost of servicing outweighs the benefits from continued repayment.    14 
e.  the types of collateral that qualify for synthetic transactions are: cash, certificates 
of deposit, gold, rated debt securities, certain unrated debt securities, equities15 
and funds; and 
f.  transaction must not contain clauses that would (i) limit credit protection, (ii) 
alter the nature of the credit risk transfer or (iii) alter the securitised exposures 
in a way that would deteriorate the quality of the reference portfolio. 
 
Once a traditional (true sale) or synthetic securitisation meets these requirements, the securitised 
exposures are subject to a regulatory treatment pursuant to the securitisation framework.16 Under 
the securitisation framework, both originating and investing banks are required to provide a 
regulatory capital charge for the risk-weighted assets of securitised exposures held.17  
 
Moreover, in combination with the (Third) Consultative Paper to the New Basle Accord (Basle 
Committee, 2003) the Second Working Paper on the Treatment of Asset Securitisation represents the first 
attempt to expand the Securitisation Framework ( s e e  F i g .  1 )  i n  a  r e v i s e d  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  r i s k -
weightings (RWs) of securitised assets. In particular, the proposition aims to discriminate 
between rated and unrated securitisation exposures held by originating and investing banks. The 
regulatory policy put forward by the (Third) Consultative Paper to the New Basle Accord distinguishes 
between two methodologies for the treatment of securitisation transactions in keeping with the 
general regulatory treatment of credit risk: the standardised approach and the internal ratings-based 
approach (IRB), where the latter approach breaks down into the supervisory formula approach (SFA) 
and the ratings-based approach (RBA) in an advanced treatment of positions in securitisation 
transactions.  
 
2.3.1  Standardised approach for securitisation exposures 
 
§526 (Third) Consultative Paper to the New Basle Accord (Basle Committee, 2003) explicitly mentions 
that issuing banks have to choose the same method for the regulatory treatment of securitisation 
transactions as the one used to determine the capital requirements for the type of underlying 
                                                 
15 Only equities listed in main indices are eligible for the simple approach of operational criteria that qualify 
for eligible collateral in synthetic securitisation. The comprehensive approach allows for all equities to be 
considered. 
16 Note that the securitisation framework does not cover implicit support mechanisms, such as moral 
recourse. 
17 Generally, in §§521-524 the (Third) Consultative Paper to the New Basle Accord stipulates that banks are 
required to hold regulatory capital against all of their securitisation exposures arising from (i) the provision 
of credit risk mitigants to securitisation transactions, such as investments in asset-backed securities, (ii) the 
retention of subordinated tranches, and (iii) the extension of liquidity facilities or credit enhancements. In 
case of capital deduction for securitisation exposures, banks are required to provide appropriate regulatory 
capital by taking 50% from Tier 1 capital and 50% from Tier 2 capital – except for regulatory provisions of    15 
credit exposures. Hence, for loss of insufficient information about the designated reference 
portfolio and/or inadequate in-house credit risk management capabilities (in order to calculate 
the IRB risk-weightings and the regulatory capital requirement KIRB),18 the use of the standardised 
approach for the credit risk of the underlying exposures of securitised exposures automatically 
entails the use the standardised approach within the securitisation framework. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tab. 2. Risk-weighting (standardised approach). 
 
The standardised approach does not distinguish between originators and investors in securitisation, 
while third-party (non bank) investors are treated differently. Analogous to the standardised 
approach of ordinary credit exposures, the basic procedure for the risk-weighting of individual 
claims (in the context of securitisation, read securitised claims or tranches) is determined by the 
external rating (see Tab. 2). The risk-weights for securitised claims are based on the long-term rating 
of the securitisation products and decrease in a higher rating grade (similar to “regular” claims, 
categorised by the type of debtor, e.g. sovereigns, banks19 and corporates). These risk-weights are 
further distinguished by the type of underlying exposure, i.e. retail portfolios (individual and SME 
claims), residential property (residential mortgages) and commercial real estate (commercial mortgages). 
Whereas unrated securitisation exposures with an internal rating equivalent to a non-investment 
grade classification (i.e. below “BBB-“) are deducted from capital by issuers (§§529 and 530 
(Third) Consultative Paper to the New Basle Accord),20 the unrated most senior tranche of a 
                                                                                                                                            
any expected future margin income, which would need to be deducted from Tier 1 capital (Basle 
Committee, 2003). 
18 KIRB is the ratio of (a) the IRB capital requirement for the underlying exposures in the securitised pool to 
(b) the notional or loan equivalent amount of exposures in the pool (e.g. the sum of drawn amounts plus 
undrawn commitments). 
19 The risk-weights for banks break down into two options: (i) risk-weighting on the country the bank is 
incorporated (Option 1) or (ii) risk-weighting based on the assessment of the individual bank (Option 2). 
Moreover, claims on banks with an original maturity of three months or less would receive a risk-weighting 
that is one category more favourable. 
20 Similarly, securitisation exposures in second loss positions do not have to be deducted if the first loss 
position (most junior tranche) provides enough protection (§§529 and 532 (Third) Consultative Paper to the 
AAA to 
AA-
A+ to 
A-
BBB+ to 
BBB-
BB+ to 
BB- B+ to B- below B- Unrated
Claims on
Sovereigns 0% 20% 50% 100% 100% 150% 100%
Banks Option 1 20% 50% 100% 100% 100% 150% 100%
Option 2 20% 50% 50% 100% 100% 150% 50%
Corporates 20% 50% 100% 100% 150% 150% 100%
Securitisation products 
(long-term rating) 20% 50% 100% 350%
Capital 
deduction
Capital 
deduction
Capital 
deduction
Rating Grades   16 
securitisation transaction would be subject to a so-called look-through treatment, i.e. the risk-weight 
is determined by the average risk-weighting of the underlying credits. However, as illustrated in 
Tab. 2, the capital charges of securitised claims (esp. for non-investment grade tranches) are 
substantially higher than the charges imposed on corporate and bank credits with the same 
rating.21 
 
2.3.2  Internal ratings-based approach (IRB) for securitisation exposures 
 
The IRB approach extends the standardised approach along two dimensions. First, it (i) modifies the 
external ratings-based assignment of risk-weightings (RWs) of the standardised approach by controlling 
for tranche size, maturity and granularity of securitisation tranches (ratings-based approach (RBA); 
see Tab. 2)22 and (ii) introduces the supervisory formula approach (SFA) as an internal-ratings based 
(IRB) measure to allow for more regulatory flexibility of issuers (and investors) with sophisticated 
credit risk management capabilities, which would otherwise not be accounted for in the 
standardised approach.  
 
Second, according to §567 (Third) Consultative Paper to the New Basle Accord (Basle Committee, 
2003) the IRB approach departs from an undifferentiated treatment of originators and investors 
in securitisation markets under the standardised approach. A distinction of originating and investing 
banks requires that (i) investors generally use the ratings-based approach (RBA) (except for those 
approved by national supervisors to use supervisory formula approach (SFA) for certain exposures), 
and (ii) originators use either the supervisory formula approach (SFA) or the ratings-based approach 
(RBA), depending on the availability of an external or inferred rating and sufficient information 
about the securitised exposures (see Tab. 4). Originating banks are required to calculate KIRB in all 
cases and hold capital against held positions (i.e. securitisation claims/tranches) as follows:  
 
(i)  unrated tranches: 
a.  insufficient information to calculate the IRB capital charge from KIRB: full capital 
deduction; 
                                                                                                                                            
New Basle Accord). Third-party (non-bank) investors may recognise external ratings up to “BB+” to “BB-” 
for risk-weighting purposes of securitisation exposures, i.e. capital deduction for securitised claims applies 
only for rating grades of “B+” and lower. 
21 The (Third) Consultative Paper to the New Basle Accord also proposes specific risk-weightings according to the 
type of underlying exposure: (i) claims included in regulatory retail portfolios (75% risk-weighting), i.e. 
exposures to individuals (e.g. credit card debt, auto loans, personal finance) or SMEs with low granularity 
(e.g. single obligor concentration must not be higher than 0.2% of overall regulatory retail portfolio) and 
low individual exposure (i.e. maximum counterparty exposure not higher than €1 million); (ii) claims secured by 
residential property (35% risk-weighting); and (iii) claims secured by commercial real estate (100% risk-weighting). 
22 Hence, both the standardised approach and the internal ratings-based approach (IRB) allow for qualifying 
external ratings and various operational criteria (see §525 (Third) Consultative Paper to the New Basle Accord 
(2003)) to be used in the ratings-based approach (RBA).    17 
b.  sufficient information to calculate the IRB capital charge from KIRB: capital 
deduction of tranche sizes (“thickness levels”) up to KIRB, then application of the 
supervisory formula approach (SFA). 
c.  The maximum capital requirement is capped at KIRB regardless of the notional 
amount of unrated tranches. 
 
(ii)  rated tranches: 
a.  inferred rating: risk-weighting according to the ratings-based approach (RBA) based on 
the rating of the externally rated subordinate tranche, provided that it is longer in 
maturity; 
b.  external rating23: capital deduction of tranche sizes (“thickness levels”) up to KIRB, 
then risk-weighting according to the ratings-based approach (RBA).24 
c.  The maximum capital requirement is capped at KIRB regardless of the notional 
amount of unrated tranches. 
 
Investing banks would need to use the ratings-based approach (RBA) if an external rating were 
available or could be inferred, irrespective of whether a position held falls below or above the KIRB 
boundary. Unrated positions must be deducted unless the investing bank receives supervisory 
approval to calculate the KIRB through SFA like originating banks if the position in question is 
above the KIRB  threshold. 
 
The  supervisory formula approach (SFA) determines the regulatory requirement for each issued 
tranche  ∈ km  as “risk-weighted asset”, where the (regulatory) IRB capital charge for a certain 
tranche amount (i.e. its exposure at inception) is multiplied by factor 12.5 (which would imply a 
full capital deduction of the tranche size if the IRB capital charge amounts to a 100% risk-
weighting at an 8% capital ratio). The SFA-based regulatory capital requirement is computed on 
the basis of five essential bank-supplied input variables, reflecting the structured risk of the 
transaction set forth in Section III Credit Risk – the Internal Ratings-based Approach (Basle Committee, 
2002a):  IRB K , the internal ratings-based (IRB) capital charge that would be applied had the 
underlying exposures not been securitised (but held directly on the sponsor’s balance sheet);25 the 
                                                 
23 i.e. public ratings only. 
24 see §§575-577 (Third) Consultative Paper to the New Basle Accord. 
25 The Basle Committee defines  IRB K  as the ratio of (i) the IRB-based capital requirements including the 
EL portion for the underlying reference portfolio of securitised assets to (ii) the exposure amount of the 
“exposure amount of the pool (e.g. the sum of drawn amounts related to securitised exposures plus the 
EAD [exposure-at-default] associated with undrawn commitments related to securitised exposures (Basle 
Committee, 2002a).” The IRB-based capital requirements have to be calculated in accordance with the IRB 
approach for credit risk as if the securitised exposures were continued to be held by the originating bank, 
mainly because it reflects the beneficial effect of any credit risk mitigant applied to the underlying reference 
portfolio on all of the securitised exposures.     18 
“credit enhancement level” of each tranche (position)  k L ; the “thickness” of each tranche  k T ; 
the effective total number N of loans in the securitised loan pool; and the exposure-weighted 
average loss-given-default (LGD) of the given reference portfolio.26 The IRB capital charge for 
each tranche k27 is defined as the amount of securitised exposures  k C  multiplied by 
() ( ) max 0.0056 , kk k k TSL T SL ×+ −   , where the supervisory formula (SF) is defined by the 
function  () . S , and the credit enhancement level  k L  gives rise to an intensity-based approximation of 
the tranche-specific capital charge.28 This securitisation framework of the Second Working Paper on 
the Treatment of Asset Securitisation was subsequently followed by a period of intense negotiations 
between national regulatory authorities and banks about the risk sensitivity of proposed measures 
during the so-called third consultative phase, which resulted in the (Third) Consultative Paper in 
April 2003. For further amendments in response to continued concern by the banking industry 
eventually established a new securitisation framework within the revised Basle Accord on 
International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards in 2004. 
 
2.4  Amendments to the Third Consultative Paper:  Changes to the Securitisation 
Framework and International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital 
Standards: Credit Risk – Securitisation Framework 
 
In October 2003 the Basle Committee announced plans to revise the internal ratings-based (IRB) 
approach within the securitisation framework in response to criticism received by the banking 
industry, which mainly concentrated on what was considered an unbalanced treatment of senior 
securitised asset exposures and conventional credit risk of the same rating grade. After the Basle 
Committee issued a working paper on proposed Changes to the Securitisation Framework (Basle 
Committee, 2004) in the bid to reduce the complexity and the burden of implementing the 
provisions of the Second Working Paper on Asset Securitisation and the (Third) Consultative Paper (CP3) 
on 30 January 2004, it finally published new guidelines on the treatment of asset securitisation as 
part of the International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: Credit Risk – 
Securitisation Framework in June 2004. Based on the Changes to the Securitisation Framework the 
Committee affirms efforts to (i) install greater internal consistency of risk-weightings applied to 
similar securitisation exposures, irrespective of the approach used (SFA vs. RBA) and (ii) 
eliminate differences in the treatment of securitisation exposures held by originators and 
investors (see Tab. 3). 
 
                                                 
26 See Appendix 1, section 6.1 for the definition of the effective total number of exposures N and the 
average loss-given-default (LGD). 
27 Note that whenever a bank holds proportional interest in a tranche, the capital charge for this position 
equals a commensurate proportion of the capital charge of the entire tranche. 
28 See Appendix 2, section 6.2 for the specification of the supervisory formula (SF) and the credit enhancement 
level L.     19 
Non-Investment 
Grade Rating
Investment Grade 
Rating
Max. capital 
requirement: KIRB
SFA/
Simplified SFA2
Max. capital 
requirement: KIRB
RBA
Max. capital 
requirement: KIRB
RBA
Originating Bank1
IRB Approach
Max. capital 
requirement: None
All positions: 
Deduction
Max. capital 
requirement: None
Max. capital 
requirement: None
Investing Bank
Standard Approach Securitisation 
exposure
All positions: Deduction Unrated4
Risk-weight (RW) of 
long-term ratings: BB+ 
to BB- (350%); all 
positions rated B+ and 
lower: Deduction
Investing Bank
All positions: 
Deduction
Risk-weight (RW) of long-term ratings: 
AAA to AA- (20%), A+ to A- (50%), 
BBB+ to BBB- (100%)
Risk-weight (RW) of short-term ratings: 
A1/P1 (20%), A2/P2 (50%), A3/P3 
(100%)
Originating 
Bank
Rated3
1: Investing banks need to seek supervisory approval for inclusion in this category of regulatory capital treatment, whereas 
originating banks automatically fall into this category. 2: The application of the Simplified SFA in lieu of the SFA is also subject 
to supervisory approval. 3: Under the IRB approach the term “rated” refers to positions with an external rating or an inferred 
rating. 4: The IAA permits originating banks to used RBA for exposures to ABCP conduits, where the internal rating 
equivalent represents an investment grade/rating.
 
Tab. 3. The new securitisation framework (Basle Committee, 2004a and 2004b). 
 
The major structural change proposed in the revision of the (Third) Consultative Paper concerns a 
refined methodological treatment of unrated and rated positions of investing and originating 
banks in securitisation transactions for regulatory purposes. For one, the new securitisation 
framework adopts the proposed Changes to the Securitisation Framework (January 2004) concerning 
the IRB approach by extending the Ratings-Based Approach (RBA) to include all rated positions 
(either rated explicitly or with an inferred rating), regardless of whether the bank is an originator 
or an investor. This provision also renders irrelevant both the availability of sufficient 
information for the computation of  IRB K 29 and the question of whether positions fall above or 
below the  IRB K  threshold as put forth by the (Third) Consultative Paper for the application of RBA 
to rated positions held by originating banks. Moreover, the RBA would also be used in the 
Internal Assessment Approach (IAA) for unrated low-risk positions,30 e.g. liquidity facilities and 
credit enhancements banks extend to ABCP conduits. The IAA maps internal risk assessments of 
such exposures to rating agency criteria for the asset type purchased by the conduit so as to more 
closely reflect leading banks’ current risk management practices. 
 
                                                 
29 i.e. the capital charge that would have been applied to the underlying exposures had they not been 
securitised. 
30 The IAA only applies to exposures with an internal rating equivalent of investment-grade at inception.     20 
Deduction
Below Ba3/BB-
[all other ratings/unrated]
650 Ba3/BB-
425 Ba2/BB
250 Ba1/BB+
100 Baa3/BBB-
75 60 (75) Baa2/BBB [A-3/P-3]
50 35 (50) Baa1/BBB+
35 (20) 20 (20) A3/A-
20 (20) 12 (20) A2/A [A-2/P-2] 35
18 (20) 10 (20) A1/A+
25 15 8 Aa/AA
20 12 7 Aaa/AAA [A-1/P-1]
Tranches backed 
by non-granular 
pools (N<6)
Base Case
Senior tranches1
(fomerly: thick 
tranches, backed 
by highly granular 
pools (N>99))
Long-term Rating Grade
[Short-term Rating Grade] 
(illustrative)
New RBA Risk Weights (CP3 RBA Risk Weights)
The “old” RBA risk weights according to the Second Working Paper on the Treatment of Asset 
Securitsation (2002) have been added in parenthesis. Note the change of the qualification criteria for 
the most preferential risk weights from “highly granular tranches” to “senior tranches”. 1: The most 
preferential risk weights are also assigned to unrated low-risk positions subject to IAA unless a 
liquidity facility or credit enhancement constituted a mezzanine position in economic substance, which 
would render applicable the “base case” applicable in this situation.
 
Tab. 4. The new long-term and short-term RBA risk-weights (Basle Committee, 2004a and 2004b).31 
 
Changes during the third consultative phase towards a revised securitisation framework also 
include a closer alignment of the RBA-based risk-weights to the actual riskiness of securitised 
positions with a high external or inferred rating (as well as low-risk exposures to ABCP, where 
the IAA applies). The proposed measure moves the focus of assigning the lowest set of risk-
weights for investment grade ratings away from the “thickness” (as in the (Third) Consultative 
Paper) to the level of seniority of exposures with little or no loss of risk sensitivity, at the cost of 
disqualifying some granular tranches from the use of the most preferential risk-weights (see Tab. 
4).32 Separate risk-weights are assigned to (i) senior, granular tranches, (ii) non-senior, granular 
tranches (“base case”) and (iii) tranches backed by non-granular pools. The change of eligibility 
for the preferential risk-weights is also accompanied by a more fine-tuned differentiation of risk-
                                                 
31 The “mark-up” of risk-weights on securitisation tranches can be illustrated by comparing the IRB risk-
weights per se for an underlying asset class, e.g. residential mortgages and corporate loans, with the risk-
weights imposed on securitisation claims. The difference is the greatest especially for low investment grade 
ratings (e.g. “A”, “Baa1” and “Baa2”). 
32 Generally, the working paper on Changes to the Securitisation Framework defines the term “senior tranche” in 
context of RBA as a position that is “effectively backed or secured by a first claim on the entire amount of 
the assets in the underlying securitised pool.” Although this definition may only apply to the most senior 
position within a securitisation transaction, “in some instances there may be some other claim that, in a 
technical sense, may be more senior in the waterfall (e.g. a swap claim) but will be disregarded for the    21 
weights for different levels of investment grade-rated positions, so as to simplify the RBA 
framework. 
 
Generally, the regulatory risk-weightings for unrated positions (including liquidity facilities and 
credit enhancements extended to ABCP conduits, which are not captured by the IAA) in 
securitisation transactions continue to be based on a modified Supervisory Formula Approach (SFA), 
which, in its initial version, was considered unnecessarily complex (see Appendix 2, section 6.2). 
However, the new securitisation framework according to the International Convergence of Capital 
Measurement and Capital Standards partially redresses the complexity of the original SFA formula.33 
The Changes to the Securitisation Framework before the agreement on the definition of SFA within 
the framework of the International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards also set 
forth the so-called Simplified Supervisory Formula (“Simplified SF”) as an alternative calculation to 
the existing Supervisory Formula (SF) of the (Third) Consultative Paper, easing some the 
computational burden involved in the old SF.34 However, the Simplified SF did not find entry in 
the final agreement on a new securitisation framework as subsection to the agreement on 
International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards in June 2004. 
 
Additionally, the Basle Committee decided to develop less restrictive operational criteria for the 
“top-down” IRB approach under the (Third) Consultative Paper to calculating  IRB K , especially for 
purchased receivables as securitised exposures. This revision reflects the inability of many banks 
during the consultative process to decompose expected loss estimates into reliable estimates of 
default probabilities (PD) and loss-given default (LGD). A flexible regime of deriving the capital 
charge for these assets (consistent with the IAA) would allow banks to rely on their own LGD 
estimates.  
 
Overall, the revision of the securitisation framework enhances internal consistency across the 
standardised and IRB approaches as regards the treatment of both unrated and rated positions. 
This effort addresses concerns by the banking industry about the need for greater consistency 
within the securitisation framework in the way capital charges are computed on similar 
securitisation exposures irrespective of the approach (SFA or RBA) being used. The Simplified SF 
and the IAA represent viable alternatives to the modification of the original SF of the (Third) 
Consultative Paper in order to (i) simplify the complex IRB approach for unrated positions and (ii) 
reconcile the difference between the two-factor model used to verify the RBA risk-weights and 
                                                                                                                                            
purpose of determining which positions are subject to the ‘senior tranches’ column (Basle Committee, 
2004a).” 
33 Note that the final Basle agreement on the International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital 
Standards (2004) suggests the elimination of the non-linear solution to the computation of a minimum risk 
weighting (i.e the “Floor”) for a given tranche thickness (see Appendix 3, section 6.3). 
34 See Appendix 4, section 6.4 for the definition of the Simplified SF.    22 
the single risk factor model applied in the context of SFA. Moreover, the implementation of the 
so-called “external rating override” grants originating banks (like investing banks) the privilege to 
calculate RBA-based risk-weights even if a rated position falls below the  IRB K  boundary. This 
expanded use of RBA, irrespective of whether the tranche size meets the  IRB K  threshold, rewards 
the use of the IRB approach of securitisation especially for non-investment grade rated tranches, 
whereas the more fine-tuned treatment of senior tranches (and the associated benefit of 
preferential risk-weights) helps align capital requirements closer to the actual risk included in low-
risk investment grade tranches. This measure attests to the growing importance of external 
ratings as market signals of the inherent risk of securitisation exposures, which should carry the 
same regulatory capital charges irrespective of the holders of such positions.35 Finally, the Basle 
Committee upholds the original prerequisite of significant credit risk transfer in a securitisation 
transaction to ensure integrity of the securitisation framework between securitised and non-
securitised exposures within the overall revision of the capital requirements of the new Basle 
Accord. 
 
3  CASE STUDY: THE OPTIMISATION OF REGULATORY 
CAPITAL 
 
The new Basle Accord on the International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards 
(“Basle 2”) presents a consistent securitisation framework, which all but eliminates possibilities of 
regulatory arbitrage through securitisation due to both (i) a more risk-sensitive computation of 
the capital charge for on-balance sheet credit exposures and (ii) a close alignment of capital 
requirements of securitised exposures and non-securitised credit exposures. While the mitigation 
of regulatory capital requirements cannot be deemed the single most important motivation for 
securitisation, regulatory optimisation has influenced and continues to influence the way issuers 
devise and advance securitisation techniques to transfer asset exposures to capital markets until 
the new Basle Accord comes into effect in 2006. If we were to limit our analysis to the regulatory 
capital charge of originating banks only, benefits from securitisation still remain if the issuer incurs 
different capital charges for non-securitised and securitised exposures of similar credit risk and 
both operational and processing costs remain low. Let us assume that under the existing Basle 
Accord a portfolio of on-balance sheet credit exposures would translate into 100% risk-weighted 
                                                 
35 At the same time, the Basle Committee rejects further decomposition of risk-weights into portions of 
unexpected loss (UL) and expected loss (EL) in the bid to increase risk sensitivity of the securitisation 
framework due to the current definition of  IRB K  as the sum of UL and EL portions of on-balance sheet 
credit risk exposures. Since the EL tends to be relatively small compared to UL for senior securitisation 
positions the existing capital requirements are treated as fully representing capital against UL for 
investment grade-rated positions and unrated positions above  IRB K . Conversely, in the case of unrated 
positions that fall below  IRB K  or are rated non-investment grade, full deduction of the notional tranche    23 
assets (RWA), which draw a standard capital charge of 8% (“capital ratio”) on their notional 
amount. Hence, any arrangement that yields minimum capital requirement for securitised 
exposures of less than 8% under simplifying assumptions would attest to regulatory optimisation 
through asset securitisation.36 The different degrees of reduced regulatory capital requirements of 
securitised credit risk exposure can be best illustrated on the basis of the disparate configurations 
of transaction structures commonly used in loan securitisation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tab. 4. Effects of transaction structure on the regulatory capital requirement of securitised credit risk. 
 
In Tab. 4 we traverse the spectrum of different structures of securitisation transactions – from 
conventional (true sale) to synthetic securitisation – to show the capital requirements of an originating 
bank. Under the most straightforward transaction type of conventional true sale securitisation, the 
asset originator completes an outright asset sale to an SPV, which issues senior and mezzanine 
debt securities (notes) to capital market investors, where the originator retains a first loss position 
(FLP) as commitment device to mitigate default risk. In the first transaction type of Tab. 4 
(traditional/true sale structure), we assume investor notes to amount to 96% of the transaction 
volume (with 92% senior notes and 4% mezzanine notes) and an FLP of 4% relative notional 
                                                                                                                                            
amount appears sufficiently adequate to account for the changing proportions of EL and UL in declining 
seniority of securitised exposures. 
36 This assumption implies that the revised framework for the risk-sensitive treatment of credit risk 
exposures under the new agreement of International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards is 
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value. After completion of off-balance sheet refinancing through a true sale securitisation, a bank 
originator would have cut its regulatory capital requirement by half, as it is now required to hold 
equity of only 4% of the securitised reference portfolio (according to 100% risk weighting of 
outstanding liabilities from the retention of FLP).  
 
The fully funded synthetic equivalent of this form of asset risk transfer (with a SPV) may even 
further reduce minimum capital requirements. For the same portfolio quality, the associated loss 
severity37 in synthetic structures is considered smaller than in true sale transactions due to a more 
clear definition of default events. With a fully deductible FLP of only 2% and 98% credit risk 
protection  provided by an OECD bank (via a credit default swap (CDS) with 20% risk 
weighting), the overall capital charge of this fully funded synthetic (indirect)38 transaction would drop 
to 3.568% ( ) 2% 100% 98% 20% 8% ×+ × ×  of the notional amount of the securitisation 
transaction. If the CDS was to be secured (“collateralised”) with 0% risk-weighted assets (e.g. 
government debt securities), the issuer would need to provide regulatory capital in the amount of 
FLP at only 2%. The same capital charge applies to the alternative construct of a partially funded 
synthetic transaction, where the credit risk protection is tailored to cover 98% of the notional value 
of the underlying reference portfolio, with 2% equity retention by the originator. In this case, 
90% of the remaining 98% of the portfolio value is hedged with a super senior swap (SSS) and 
10% are refinanced by debt securities on the back of a junior swap (JS) agreement, which results 
in a risk-weighted capital charge of  ( ) 2% 100% 98% 90% 10% 20% 8% 3.568% ×+ ×+× × = . If 
the junior CDS was collateralised by 0% risk-weighted assets or supported by a quasi-government 
agency,39 the minimum capital requirement would decline to 3.411% 
( ) ( ) 2% 100% 98% 90% 20% 10% 0% 8% ×+ ×× + × × . If both CDSs were to be collateralised in a 
similar fashion the capital charge would be merely 2% 
( ) ( ) 2% 100% 98% 90% 10% 0% 8% ×+ ×+ ×  of the notional value. This straightforward 
illustration of changes in the computation of regulatory requirements due to different transaction 
structures has motivated the appellation of securitisation as a regulatory arbitrage tool, which 
                                                                                                                                            
ignored and any collateral eligible for a risk weight reduction as well as transaction costs of securitisation 
are disregarded for the purposes of this analysis. 
37 i.e. the aggregate loss of securitised loans after the enforcement of collateral used to secure these loans. 
38 Synthetic transactions come in various structures of security design, which can be specified along three 
major dimensions: (i) level of funding: unfunded, (fully) funded or partially funded, (ii) involvement of a 
SPV as issuing agent (indirect or direct securitisation), (iii) degree of collateralisation of funded elements 
(with or without collateral, e.g. government bonds, guarantees, letter of credit, certificate of indebtedness, 
Pfandbriefe). The classification of indirect securitisation refers to the involvement of a SPV as issuing agent. 
The funding level indicates the degree to which the notional amount of issued debt securities matches up 
with the volume of the underlying reference portfolio of asset exposures. The term “fully funded” refers to 
a complete refinancing of securitised exposures by issued debt securities. 
39 e.g. the KfW banking group in Germany or one of the federal/state mortgage corporations in the U.S..    25 
enables issuers to significantly alleviate their regulatory capital burden by means of sophisticated 
credit risk transfer.  
 
If asset originators and/or issuers should also decide to offer the FLP to capital market investors 
in a bid to further reduce capital requirements, they would do so by underwriting a so-called 
interest sub-participation agreement as credit enhancement of the FLP as the most junior tranche of 
the transaction (Böhringer et al., 2001). The interest sub-participation replaces the full capital 
deduction of FLP at a capital ratio of 8% and 100% risk weighting (see Tab. 4). In the event of 
default loss, interest sub-participation requires the issuer to compensate any losses absorbed by 
FLP investors from generated interest income of the reference portfolio after more senior claims 
to interest and principal have been satisfied. Although junior noteholders of FLP would loose 
interest payments on defaulted loans, sub-participation guarantees the repayment of principal. 
For instance, if a securitised reference portfolio was to be hit by a loss given default of 5% and 
the annual excess interest income would amount to 0.5% of the original portfolio balance on 
average, investors would be fully reimbursed after 10 years. The effect of incorporating interest 
sub-participation in securitisation structures is illustrated in the right-most column of Tab. 4. 
Note that all calculations above merely offer an indication of the regulatory trade-off in 
securitisation and how regulatory optimisation translates into a lower capital charge. We have 
ignored any transaction costs incurred in the administration and underwriting of securitisation 
transactions, be they explicit (e.g. legal costs, structuring costs, payments to rating agencies and 
intermediaries/agents,  management fees) or implicit (e.g. funding cost after securitisation, 
reputation effects). Moreover, we have considered the level of FLP to be equal to the minimum 
capital requirement of securitised credit risk, so that issuers and/or originators would not need to 
hold capital against securitised debt securities whose level of credit enhancement is smaller than 
the minimum capital requirement of securitised credit risk. 
 
4 CONCLUSION:  THE  IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT 
REGULATORY TREATMENT OF ASSET SECURITISATION 
 
The pathological evolution of the securitisation framework under the revised Basle Accord 
reflects the successive steps the Basle Committee has taken over time to eliminate arbitrage 
opportunities from loan securitisation under existing provisions for the regulatory treatment of 
credit risk under the old 1988 Basle Accord and later amendments. Prior to the recent agreement 
on new capital standards for credit risk, securitisation techniques remedied the glaring 
incompatibility between the regulatory capital charge and the actual economic cost of credit risk 
across the spectrum of varying rating grades (i.e. regulatory “mispricing” of credit risk). In 
absence of risk-sensitive capital adequacy requirements for credit exposures and with little 
regulatory guidance as to how banks should compute their capital charge for securitised    26 
exposures, asset securitisation has been labelled a sensible market reaction to inefficient 
regulatory governance of credit risk in the banking system. So from a regulatory perspective, 
securitisation is essentially a child of its own making due to anomalies in the regulatory system 
giving rise to regulatory arbitrage. Needless to say, this use of securitisation aroused concern 
among regulators about the troubling prospect of (i) an insufficient provision of minimum capital 
requirements to absorb actual default loss and (ii) an inadequate treatment of unexpected risk. As 
regards the latter aspect, regulators specifically worried about the absorption of unexpected losses 
by more senior tranches held by capital market investors in the event of financial shocks, while 
originators held merely some concentrated risk exposure of expected losses in the form of a 
junior claim as first loss position. 
 
The new Basle Accord on the International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards 
(“Basle 2”) restrains regulatory arbitrage through securitisation along two dimensions. On one 
hand, the capital charge for on-balance sheet credit exposures has been made more risk-sensitive, 
and, on the other hand, the regulatory treatment of securitisation transactions has been closely 
aligned to match the capital requirements for non-securitised credit exposures.40 In anticipation 
of imminent regulatory change,41 asset securitisation no longer appears to deserve the now-
hackneyed moniker of a pure (regulatory) arbitrage tool, flaunting the gap between internal 
default provisions for default loss and external risk assessment methods of risk-weighted assets 
by offering “regulatory overcharged asset holdings/exposures” to capital market investors.  
 
Given the implementation of discriminatory risk-weightings in the revised Basle Accord and a 
separate regulatory framework for the treatment of asset securitisation, the prospective change of 
the current regulatory regime censures institutional arbitrage on regulatory capital requirements, 
which has hitherto motivated the securitisation of investment-grade loans (see section 1.1). Since 
a higher capital charge levied on risky assets will also carry larger risk-based capital haircuts 
                                                 
40 Giddy (1997) proffers a new approach to the regulatory treatment of asset securitisation in his definition 
of “perimeters of bank regulation in securitisation”. According to his view, the goal ought to be that the 
substance and not the form of the asset transfer is what governs capital requirements. Giddy notes in this 
respect that regulatory authorities may access capital or reserve requirements as if the financing was a 
secured borrowing in cases when the transfer of assets/asset risk (i) leaves the issuer open to recourse 
deemed risky by the authorities, and/or (ii) entails the potential for moral hazard, whereby a bank shores 
up potential or actual losses arising from the securitised exposures in order to protect its name even when 
not legally required to do so. 
41 The new proposals for the revision of the Basle Accord remedy this shortcoming through the 
implementation of discriminatory risk-weightings across rating categories. Under this so-called “ratings-
based approach” (RBA) risk weights will be more closely aligned to loan grades in the loan book. If the 
broad-brushed regulatory treatment of loans disappears, banks will increasingly resort to non-investment 
loan assets to support their securitisation transaction, and by doing so, they will put a premium on the 
adequate allocation of first loss provision as credit enhancement. Consequently, the incentive to securitise 
non-investment grade loans adds topical significance to the issue of credit enhancement, as the differences 
between collateral (reference portfolio) quality and desired structured rating is expected to widen in the 
future.     27 
contingent on the characteristics of collateralisation, the incentive for the securitisation of non-investment 
grade loans rises. The relationship between the risk level of non-investment grade loans and the 
associated economic capital cost will determine the extent to which banks and other financial 
institutions are prepared to substitute high-risk assets (i.e. non-investment grade loans with 
presumably high capital haircuts) for investment grade-related credit exposures on their loan 
books – a reversal of the present drainage of low-risk loans off the balance sheet. Hence, loan 
securitisation, originally devised as a remedy to inflexible regulatory capital charges, will be 
instrumental in the efficient management of economic capital for purposes of adequate asset allocation.  
 
With the arbitrage paradigm of securitisation giving way to an envisaged reconciliation of 
economic and regulatory incentives, the role of securitisation as an efficient mechanism to 
optimise overall regulatory capital charge looks distinctly uncertain. This development begs the 
question of whether the fundamental economic rationale of asset securitisation does exist and, if 
so, whether it remains viable. However, the new reality of a more responsive regulatory setting does 
not invalidate, but rather strengthens, the argument for risk-adjusted efficiency gains (of economic 
capital) from loan securitisation. In spite of regulatory changes underway, securitisation markets 
betray no visible signs of change. The unfettered popularity of asset securitisation implies that 
issuers appropriate economic benefits from converting illiquid assets into tradable debt securities 
in the effort to economise on a predefined level of acceptable first loss exposure. Securitisation 
also maintains its economic edge, as it enables banks and non-bank financial institutions to reap 
rewards from advanced approaches in controlling credit risk and reduce inessential non-interest 
rate expenses. 
 
Additionally, recent empirical evidence about financial innovation in transaction structures 
testifies to the pervasive adaptability and systemic flexibility of asset securitisation. Although it 
has become a routine procedure of structured finance, and informed investors have grown 
familiar with its structural characteristics, loan securitisation has preserved sufficient flexibility to 
absorb regulatory change. Hence, loan securitisation in its current state is not a permanent 
account of efforts to achieve marketability of credit exposures, but an example of structured 
finance of its age (when regulatory arbitrage was possible), with properties that originally fed on 
the absence of a fair internal ratings-based determination of loan default risk. The current 
regulatory reform simply inaugurates another round of innovation in security design of loan 
securitisation. The advocacy of securitisation on the grounds of economic benefits makes this 
argument even more compelling and imminent. However, as risk-sensitive bank capital charges 
eliminate the regulatory capital arbitrage paradigm of securitisation, the security design of asset-
backed securities can only be sufficiently accommodating of these regulatory changes if the    28 
arguments for risk management and efficient asset funding as fundamental economic reasons for 
securitisation hold.  
 
In a nutshell, it is fair to say that the supervisory responsiveness of the Basle Committee to the 
accretion of structured finance has led to a more risk sensitive securitisation framework of the 
agreement on International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards, which has all but 
eliminated the optimisation of regulatory capital as an incentive of credit risk transfer through 
securitisation. Nonetheless, with the problem of insensitive regulatory treatment of credit risk 
exposures curtailed in the wake of the securitisation framework, the regulatory treatment of 
securitised exposures falls short of satisfying regimented coherence. The persistent discrepancy of 
the regulatory capital of similar exposures of securitised debt under the standardised and IRB 
approaches, and the strategic imbalance implied in the discriminatory derivation minimum capital 
requirements for credit risk and securitised positions of similar risk, remain sources of continued 
contention and scrupulous analysis. Given the significant cost of synthetic securitisation, the 
relationship between security design and the economic cost of securitised exposures as well as 
derivative elements will become more prominent considerations in structured finance 
transactions and warrant further regulatory progression.    29 
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6 APPENDIX 
 
6.1  Appendix 1: Definition of the effective number of exposures and loss-given default 
 
The effective number of exposures (N) and the exposure-weighted average loss-given-default 
(LGD) are defined as42  
  ( ) ∑ ∑ = i i i i EAD EAD N
2 2   
and 
  ( ) ∑ × ∑ = i i i i i EAD EAD LGD LGD .  
 
i EAD  denotes the exposure-at-default of all exposures to the ith obligor in keeping with the 
general concept of a concentration ratio, where the scale of the weighting factor grows at a 
geometric rate, and  i LGD  denotes the average loss-given-default of all exposures to the ith 
obligor.43 The thickness of exposures (T) is defined as the ratio of (i) the nominal size  k C  of 
tranche k to (ii) the notional amount of securitised exposures C  in the underlying reference 
portfolio 
  ∑ = =
m
k k k k C C T 1 .  
 
6.2  Appendix 2: Definition of the original Supervisory Formula (SF) and the credit enhancement level 
according to the Second Working Paper on the Treatment of Asset Securitisation and the (Third) 
Consultative Paper (CP3) 
 
The original “supervisory formula” (SF)  () . S  is defined as 
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where 
  ( ) 1 IRB cK h = −   
                                                 
42 The Basle Committee also proposed simplified methods for computing N and LGD. 
43 The Second Working Paper on the Treatment of Asset-Backed Securitisation also provides a simplified method of 
computing the effective number of exposures and the exposure-weighted average loss-given-default (Basle 
Committee, 2002, 36).    32 
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The credit enhancement level (L) is measured (in decimal form) as the ratio of (i) the amount of all 
securitised positions subordinate to tranche k to (ii) the notional amount of all securitised 
exposures, which could also expressed as44  
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The supervisory-determined parameters are defined as  0056 . 0 = Floor  (lowest capital charge 
under the ratings-based approach (RBA)), τ=1,000 and ω = 20 , and 
*
k L  solves for the non-
linear equation
45 
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6.3  Appendix 3: Definition of the new Supervisory Formula (SF) in the Changes to the Securitisation 
Framework (2004) 
 
                                                 
44 According to the Basle Committee banks will be required to determine the level of credit enhancement 
prior to any consideration of effects of any tranche-specific credit enhancements, such as third-party 
guarantees, which might benefit a single tranche only. Further stipulations exclude any gains-on-sale from 
the computation of the level of credit enhancement, whereas interest rate and currency swaps more junior 
than tranche k may be only be considered at their current value or be ignored otherwise.    33 
After elimination of the optimal solution 
*
k L  to the non-linear definition of some required Floor, 
the new Supervisory Formula (SF) according to the International Convergence of Capital Measurement and 
Capital Standards would have been defined as:   
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6.4  Appendix 4: Definition of the Simplified Supervisory Formula (Simplified SF) in the Changes to the 
Securitisation Framework (2004) 
 
The Simplified Supervisory Formula (“Simplified SF”) fundamentally relies on slicing securitisation 
exposures into infinitesimally thin tranches (“ITTs”) and combines the 
() () k IRB k L K L Factor Risk × = 5 . 12 as risk-weight for each ITT given  IRB K  and 
() () () []
N
IRB k k K L N L Factor Discount
2 1 1 , − − = , so that the risk-weight for a securitised 
position (tranche) [] k k k T L L + ,  can be approximately derived by averaging the risk-weights 
from the product of the Risk Factor and the Discount Factor at the boundaries. The Simplified SF  
 
 
N
IRB
k k
k k
IRB
N
IRB
k
k
IRB
K
T L
T L
K
K
L
L
K
2 2
1
1 5 . 12
5 . 0
1
1 5 . 12
5 . 0  


 


−
− −
 


 


+
×
+  


 


−
−
 


 

 ×
  
 
could further be extended to an infinite i number of ITTs by conditioning thickness  K T  by factor 
I i . Note that this approach eliminates exposure-weighted average LGDs from the computation 
of the capital charge of unrated positions, so that two pools with the same  IRB K  cannot 
potentially yield different capital requirements. Hence, in Changes to the Securitisation Framework the 
Basle Committee proposes subjecting N to a cap on its maximum value, mainly because a large 
effective number N of securitised exposures might yield substantially lower capital charges than 
the modified SFA; yet, this issue remains to be verified as to its material effects on actual 
transactions.` 
                                                                                                                                            
45 The specification  [] b a L Beta , ;  refers to a cumulative beta distribution function with parameters a and b 
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